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NOTES
GARCIA REVISITED: THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT'S APPLICATION TO
APPOINTED STATE COURT JUDGES
INTRODUCTION
Congress [can]not act under its commerce power to infringe on certain
fundamental aspects of state sovereignty that are essential to 'the
States' separate and independent existence....' [A]nd I do not think it
incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell out further the fine points
of a principle that will, I am confident, in time again command the
support of a majority of this Court.'
Justice Rehnquist's prediction in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority' may be realized this spring when the Supreme Court
considers Gregory v. Ashcroft.3 Federal circuit courts have been rigor-
ously debating whether appointed state court judges are protected by the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA").4 Both the Eighth
Circuit, in Gregory, and the First Circuit, in EEOC v. Massachusetts, held
that ADEA does not apply to appointed state court judges.5 In EEOC v.
Vermont, however, the Second Circuit refused to follow suit and arrived
at the opposite conclusion.6
Since it was amended in 1986,' ADEA has purported to preempt pro-
visions in state constitutions8 that mandate the retirement of state
judges.9 This application of ADEA, however, "strikes very closely to the
1. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 579-80 (1985) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Chief Justice Burger and Justices O'Connor and
Powell also dissented.
2. Id
3. 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990).
4. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988)). ADEA was enacted under the
Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.3. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(4) (1988); see also
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983) (ADEA passed under Commerce Clause).
Thus, principles of federalism may limit its application to the states. See infra notes 65-
73 and accompanying text.
5. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 604 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct.
507 (1990); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 58 (1st Cir. 1988).
6. See EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 800 (2d Cir. 1990).
7. The 1986 amendment outlawed mandatory retirement by eliminating the upper
age limit in the statute. See Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-592, 100 Stat. 3342 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1988)); infra
notes 18 & 25 and accompanying text.
8. When a federal law clearly intends to displace a state constitution or law, the state
law is preempted. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746-47 (1981); Hisquierdo v.
Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979); New York State Dep't of Social Services v. Dub-
lino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973); Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952).
9. Thirty-five states and the District of Columbia have either constitutional provi-
sions or laws mandating the retirement of at least some judges over age seventy or ev-
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heart of state sovereignty" because it infringes on the states' traditional
right to structure their own judiciaries.' ° Despite the federalism issues
involved, the debate has focused almost exclusively on whether ap-
pointed state court judges are policymakers within the meaning of an
exemption clause in ADEA."
While the Second Circuit permitted ADEA to infringe on a state's
ability to structure its own judiciary without a critical discussion of Gar-
cia,'2 the Supreme Court could seize its opportunity to overrule this case.
Garcia, which embodies the Court's current approach to federalism, held
that judicial review of commerce statutes is generally unnecessary to pro-
tect state sovereignty. 3 Applying ADEA to state judges is consistent
with congressional intent 4 and provides the Court with an opportunity
to discuss whether such application violates federalism principles.'"
When the Supreme Court considers Gregory, therefore, it may decide to
reject Garcia and reassume16 its constitutional responsibility to protect a
state right that is "essential to 'the states' separate and independent
existence.' "17
Part I of this Note provides a background of the ADEA debate, exam-
ines the conflicting interpretations of the policymaking exception, and
argues that the relevant legislative history mandates that judges should
not be viewed as policymakers under the exception. Part II describes the
federalism problems inherent in applying ADEA to appointed state court
judges. This section explores the historical debate over substantive limits
on the Commerce Clause and analyzes the Supreme Court's current ap-
proach to federalism under Garcia. The Note concludes that ADEA
should be applied to state judges, but that the important state sovereignty
right implicated merits a reevaluation of Garcia and a reassertion of judi-
cial review of conflicts between federalism and the commerce clause.
enty-five. See ABA Comm. on State Judicial Salaries, Survey of State Judicial Fringe
Benefits 7-16 (1989).
10. See Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 54; infra note 27 and accompanying text.
11. Viewing judges as policymakers may be problematic because such a view is con-
trary to some definitions of judging. See, e.g., R. Bork, The Tempting of America 149
(1990) ("The role of a judge . .. is to find the meaning of a text."). See generally, E.
Sergeant, Justice Touched With Fire, in Mr. Justice Holmes 206-07 (F. Frankfurter ed.
1931) (Holmes states his job is only to apply the law). But see Frank, Law & the Modern
Mind 121 (1930) (judges routinely make policy by creating new common law). For text
of exemption clause, see infra note 29.
12. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 27 & 62 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
17. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 579 (1985) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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I. THE ADEA DEBATE
A. The Evolution of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and
its Recurring Clash with State Sovereignty
ADEA prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of age 8
unless age is a bona fide occupational qualification. 9 In 1974, Congress
amended ADEA to apply to the states. For the following nine years,
federal courts debated whether ADEA's regulation of state employment
practices was constitutional.2 ' This debate was resolved when the
18. Originally, ADEA only protected workers between the ages of forty and sixty-
four. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 12, 81
Stat. 602, 607 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1988)). In 1978, Congress
amended ADEA to protect workers between the ages of forty and sixty-nine. See Equal
Employment Opportunity Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189.
19. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1988). Courts have refused, however, to consider
whether age is a bona fide occupational qualification for judges. See Apkin v. Treasurer
and Receiver General, 401 Mass. 427, 430 n.5, 517 N.E.2d 141, 143 n.5 (1988). If judges
are considered policymakers, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) reg-
ulations that establish criteria for determining whether a person is employed in a bona
fide executive or high policymaking decision may apply. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1625.12 (d)-(e)
(1990); 29 C.F.R. § 541 (1990).
20. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55,
59. This amendment expanded the definition of "employer" to include "a State or polit-
ical subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a political
subdivision of a State, and any interstate agency." 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1988).
21. The courts disagreed on whether ADEA violated federalism principles and
whether it was passed under the Commerce Clause, section five of the fourteenth amend-
ment, or both. Compare Carpenter v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 508 F. Supp.
148, 149 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (ADEA passed under fourteenth amendment); Arritt v. Grisell,
567 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1977) (same); Remmick v. Barnes County, 435 F. Supp.
914, 916 (D.N.D. 1977) (same) with Kenny v. Valley County School Dist., 543 F. Supp.
1194, 1198-99 (D. Mont. 1982) (ADEA enacted under Commerce Clause); McCroan v.
Bailey, 543 F. Supp. 1201, 1204 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (same); Campbell v. Connelie 542 F.
Supp. 275, 280 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (same); Bleakley v. Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 536
F. Supp. 236, 239 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (same); Taylor v. Montana Dep't of Fish & Game, 523
F. Supp. 514, 514 (D. Mont. 1981) (ADEA passed under Commerce Clause, but uncon-
stitutional if applied to state employees engaged in purely governmental functions) and
Usery v. Board of Ed. of Salt Lake City, 421 F. Supp. 718, 721 (D. Utah 1976) (ADEA
valid under both fourteenth amendment and Commerce Clause).
If ADEA were passed under the fourteenth amendment, the tenth amendment and
state sovereignty interests would be no bar to its application to the states. See EEOC v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 259 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (state sovereignty significantly limited by fourteenth
amendment); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879) (fourteenth amendment in-
tended to limit the power of the states and enlarge the power of Congress).
No Supreme Court decision has ever held that classifications based on age are suspect
and thus worthy of a high standard of review under either the equal protection clause or
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 260; see
also Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (mandatory retirement of Foreign Service
officers does not violate fourteenth amendment); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1976) (mandatory retirement of state police examined
under rational basis standard because government employment is not fundamental right
and those who are mandatorily retired are not suspect class).
It is interesting, therefore, that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Gregory on an
equal protection issue. Respondent, the Honorable John D. Ashcroft, argues that Mis-
1990]
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Supreme Court concluded, in EEOC v. Wyoming, that ADEA's applica-
tion to "state and local governments ... was a valid exercise of Congress'
powers under the Commerce Clause."22 Although the Wyoming Court
recognized substantive constitutional limitations on Congress's com-
merce power, it held that ADEA's application to state game wardens was
not sufficiently intrusive to invoke these limitations.23 The Court rea-
soned that such an application did not impair Wyoming's ability to struc-
ture its integral operations or threaten its separate and independent
existence.24
When Wyoming was decided, ADEA did not yet cover appointed state
court judges, but in 1986, Congress amended ADEA to protect all work-
ers over the age of thirty-nine.25 This amendment gave state judges age
seventy and above standing to challenge state laws mandating their re-
tirement.26 Applying ADEA to state judges, however, necessarily im-
pairs a state's ability to determine the tenure of its judiciary.27
souri's mandatory retirement rule is constitutionally deficient under City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), because the state rule relies " ' ".on a classi-
fication whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction
arbitrary or irrational .... Respondent's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir.) (quoting Appellant's Brief at 16-17 (quoting Cleburne,
473 U.S. at 446), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990)). The circuit court in Gregory
rejected this argument, however. See Gregory, 898 F.2d at 606; see also Traffelet v.
Thompson, 594 F.2d 623, 627, 629 (7th Cir.) (it is rational to treat judges differently from
other state officials), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 906 (1979); Diamond v. Cuomo, 70 N.Y.2d
338, 342, 520 N.Y.S.2d 732, 733, 514 N.E.2d 1356, 1357 (1987) (mandatory retirement of
elected judges but not appointed ones does not violate equal protection), appeal dismissed,
486 U.S. 1028; Maresca v. Cuomo, 64 N.Y.2d 242, 249-251, 485 N.Y.S.2d 724, 727-28,
475 N.E.2d 95, 98-99 (1984) (mandatory retirement of judges does not violate equal pro-
tection clause), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 802; Stout v. Pennsylvania ex rel. Preate, 521
Pa. 571, 588-89, 559 A.2d 489, 498 (1989) (age classification is rational and equal protec-
tion not violated by distinction between appointed and elected judges). But see Sabo v.
Casey, No. 90-7945 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 1991) (1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1947) (striking
down state retirement rule for judges as violation of equal protection).
22. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 243. The Wyoming Court refused to decide whether
ADEA's application to the states is a valid exercise of Congress's power under section
five of the fourteenth amendment. See id.; supra note 21.
23. See Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 239.
24. See id.
25. In 1983, only state employees between the ages of forty and sixty-nine were pro-
tected. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Most states that have mandatory re-
tirement rules for some of their judges set the retirement age at seventy or seventy-five.
See supra note 9. The 1986 amendments to ADEA, therefore, brought judges into the
protected age group. See supra note 7.
26. Mandatory retirement of persons covered by ADEA is a prima facie violation.
See EEOC v. Illinois, 721 F. Supp. 156, 157 (N.D. Ill. 1989). Assuming that appointed
state court judges are protected by ADEA, state laws mandating their retirement violate
ADEA and thus are preempted. See generally Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't,
697 F.2d 743, 752 (7th Cir.) (ADEA amendments prevail over conflicting state law), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983); see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
27. Courts that have considered whether ADEA applies to state court judges have
equated a state's ability to set the retirement age of its judges with its ability to determine
their tenure, which is an essential aspect of states' sovereign existence. See, e.g., Gregory
v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 600 (8th Cir.) (ADEA's application to state judges would
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The recent ADEA cases have not discussed Wyoming or the federal-
ism issues involved.28 Instead, these cases have concentrated on the
meaning of ADEA's exemption for state officials ("exemption clause").29
Appointed state court judges are exempted from coverage only if they are
deemed policymakers within the meaning of the policymaking
exception.30
B. Elusive Intent?-Conflicting Interpretations of the
Policymaking Exception
1. The First and Eighth Circuits' Interpretation of the
Policymaking Exception
Both EEOC v. Massachusetts3 ' and Gregory v. Ashcroft32 held that ap-
pointed state court judges are exempt from coverage under ADEA. Both
courts relied on the legislative history of the policymaking exception, 33
focusing specifically on a statement issued by Congress to explain the
meaning of the exemption clause. The statement reads:
It is the intention of the conferees to exempt elected officials and mem-
significantly intrude on a traditionally sensitive state sovereignty right), cert. granted, 111
S. Ct. 507 (1990); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 54 (Ist Cir. 1988) ("ITmhe tenure
of state judges is a question of exceeding importance to each state, and a question tradi-
tionally left to be answered by each state."); EEOC v. Illinois, 721 F. Supp. 156, 159
(N.D. Ill. 1989) (citing Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 54) (tenure of state judiciary is tradi-
tional state sovereignty right); Apkin v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 401 Mass. 427,
431, 517 N.E.2d 141, 143 (1988) (ADEA's application to state judges would violate state
sovereignty right).
28. The circuit courts' failure to address federalism issues is consistent with the doc-
trine of constitutional avoidance. This doctrine provides that courts should first ascertain
"'whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional]
question may be avoided.'" Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 278, 348
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
29. In pertinent part, ADEA exempts from coverage
any person elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of any
State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be
on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the policymaking level [here-
inafter "policymaking exception"] or an immediate adviser with respect to the
exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office.
29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1988).
30. Because appointed state court judges are not on the personal staff of, nor legal
advisors to, an elected officer, they can fall only under the policymaking exception. See
supra note 29.
31. 858 F.2d 52 (Ist Cir. 1988).
32. 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir.), cerL granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990).
33. ADEA's policymaking exception was "derived in haec verba from Title VII."
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thur-
ston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (citations omitted) (substantive provisions of Title VII and
ADEA are identical). The debate over the policymaking exception in Title VII "is rele-
vant, therefore, to the scope of the 'employee' definition in ADEA." Massachusetts, 858
F.2d at 55; see also Gregory, 898 F.2d at 602 (legislative history of Title VII is relevant to
ADEA); EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 798 (2d Cir. 1990) (ADEA was patterned
after Title VII and its identical definition of "employee" justifies looking to legislative
history of Title VII to determine meaning in ADEA).
1990]
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bers of their personal staffs, and persons appointed by such elected offi-
cials as advisors or to policymaking positions at the highest levels of
the departments or agencies of State or local governments, such as cab-
inet officers, and persons with comparable responsibilities at the local
level. It is the conferees [sic] intent that this exemption shall be con-
strued narrowly.
34
Both courts concluded that judges fell within the meaning of this ex-
planatory statement. The First Circuit viewed the statement as provid-
ing for two types of policymakers, those who are advisors and those who
need not be advisors. 35 Adopting an equally tenuous interpretation, the
Eighth Circuit explained that judges are implicitly included within the
statement because the state judiciary is an agency of state government.3 6
The First Circuit also used the congressional debate to support its
holding in Massachusetts.37 The court noted that Senator Ervin, author
of the exemption clause, wanted to prevent federal law from infringing
upon the states' ability to select state officials.3" The court surmised that
the senator's opening remarks set the context of the congressional debate
to include officials from all three branches of state government.3 9
Neither the First nor the Eighth Circuit found the legislative history to
be dispositive4 and thus went on to examine the definition of judging to
34. Joint Explanatory Statement of Managers at the Conference on H.R. 1746 to Fur-
ther Promote Equal Employment Opportunities for American Workers, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2179, 2180.
35. See Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 56.
36. See Gregory, 898 F.2d at 602-03. The court also stated that "[lthe term 'govern-
ment' in this country traditionally has implied the tripartite of the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches." Id. at 602. Both courts' conclusions arguably stretch the mean-
ing of the statement because it does not, on its face, set out two types of policymakers, nor
is the judiciary an agency of state government.
37. See Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 55 (citing 118 Cong. Rec. 1837 (1972)).
38. See EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 55 (Ist Cir. 1988) (citing 118 Cong.
Rec. 4096 (1972)). Senator Ervin stated that state sovereignty principles would be vio-
lated if Title VII usurped power from the "Governor of his State, or the people...
[regarding] whom they can elect Governor, or Supreme Court Justice, or State legislator,
or what officials shall be selected to advise the Governor as to his constitutional and legal
duties." 118 Cong. Rec. 4096 (1972); see also 118 Cong. Rec. 4483 (1972) (Comments by
Senator Ervin) (tenth amendment protects state right to select its officers and employees).
39. See Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 55 (citing 118 Cong. Rec. 1837 (1972)).
40. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 600 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct.
507 (1990); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 53 (1st Cir. 1988). Both the First and
Eighth Circuits applied a "clear intent" test. In Massachusetts, the court held that it is
improper to apply ADEA to appointed state court judges when Congress did not clearly
intend to overrule "the clear intent of the people of a state in an area intimately and
fundamentally related to that state's self-governance." Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 53.
Similarly, the court in Gregory held that it is improper to interpret ADEA "as conflicting
with the Missouri Constitution unless" Congress clearly expresses an intention to protect
state judges from age discrimination. See Gregory, 898 F.2d at 600; see also Apkin v.
Treasurer and Receiver General, 401 Mass. 427, 431, 517 N.E.2d 141, 143-46 (1988) (no
clear intent to protect appointed judges under ADEA). But see Schlitz v. Virginia, 681 F.
Supp. 330, 333 (E.D. Va. 1988) (Congress clearly intended to protect appointed statejudges from age discrimination), rev'd on other grounds, 854 F.2d 43 (4th Cir.).
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determine whether it involves policymaking.4' Both courts reasoned that
because judges make policy by filling the "interstices of authority found
in constitutions, statutes, and precedents," judges are policymakers
within the meaning of the exception.42 The court in Gregory further
noted that judges are policymakers because they establish specific rules of
decision upon which other branches of the government, the professional
community and the public rely.43 Lastly, both courts concluded that
states have rational reasons to mandate the retirement of judges. These
reasons include a desire to facilitate the appointment of more minorities
and women to the bench.'
2. The Second Circuit's Interpretation of the Policymaking Exception
Unlike the First and Eighth Circuits, the Second Circuit held, in
EEOC v. Vermont, that Congress clearly intended appointed state court
judges to enjoy ADEA's protection.4" The Second Circuit interpreted
the legislative history, and the explanatory statement46 in particular, ac-
cording to its plain meaning. 47 Because the statement contains no refer-
41. See Gregory, 898 F.2d at 601; Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 55. The court in Stil-
lians v. Iowa outlined three factors relevant to determining whether a person is a poli-
cymaker within the meaning of ADEA: "1) whether the [appointee] has discretionary,
rather than solely administrative powers, 2) whether the [appointee] serves at the plea-
sure of the appointing authority and 3) whether the [appointee] formulates policy." Sil-
lians, 843 F.2d 276, 278-79 (8th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). Gregory held that the
Stillians factors are not exhaustive, however, and stated that Congress's purpose behind
the policymaking exception "was to give '[s]tate governors ... broad discretion to fill
policymaking positions'" with the most qualified persons "'without fear of being sued
[for age discrimination] by disappointed office seekers.'" Gregory, 898 F.2d at 604 (quot-
ing Stillians, 843 F.2d at 279)).
42. EEOC v. Massachusetts, 680 F. Supp. 455, 462 (D. Mass. 1988), aff'd, 858 F.2d
52, 55 (1st Cir. 1990); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 601 (8th Cir.) (judges
make policy), cert granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990).
43. See Gregory, 898 F.2d at 601.
44. According to the First and Eighth Circuits, mandatory retirement ofjudges elimi-
nates the tedious and painful task of supervising and removing older judges of failing
competence and reduces delay in the administration of justice caused by death or illness
of older judges. See Gregory, 898 F.2d at 605; Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 57-58.
Mandatory retirement also enables a state to appoint more minorities and women to the
judiciary, thus making it more representative of society in age, race and gender. See
Gregory, 898 F.2d at 606; Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 57-58; see also Apkin, 401 Mass. at
435-36, 517 N.E.2d 141, 146 (mandatory retirement enables state to create a judiciary
more representative of society by appointing more women and minorities); Sabo v. Casey,
No. 90-7945 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 1991) (1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1947) (same); Cf. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 22, 1991, at A29, col. 1 (arguing the judiciary should reflect the diversity of
our population); Harper, What Color Justice? Harper Calls For Change, Manhattan Law-
yer, Jan./Feb. 1991, at 42 (stressing need for judiciary to be more representative of mi-
norities); N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1991, at BI, col. 4 (discussing dearth of minority judges in
federal courts). But see Stout v. Pennsylvania ex rel. Preate, 521 Pa. 571, 588, 559 A.2d
489, 505-06 (1989) (ironically, Pennsylvania's mandatory retirement law decreased
number of women in the judiciary, because Judge Stout is female).
45. See EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 797-98 (2d Cir. 1990).
46. See supra note 34.
47. See Vermont, 904 F.2d at 800.
1990]
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ences to judges and expressly mandates a narrow construction of the
exemption clause, the Vermont court held that only executive policymak-
ers at the highest levels of local government are excluded from ADEA's
coverage.4
The Second Circuit also pointed to statements in the congressional de-
bate that narrowed Senator Ervin's proposed exemption to include only
officials from the executive branch.4 9 The court focused on statements by
Senator Williams, who explained that the final draft of the exemption
clause included only those appointees "who are in a close personal rela-
tionship and an immediate relationship" with their appointing officer.50
Because judges have no immediate relationship to their appointing of-
ficers, the court reasoned that Congress did not intend to exclude them
from coverage under ADEA.51
After examining the legislative history of the policymaking exception,
the Second Circuit considered whether judges can be viewed as policy-
makers. 52 Conceding that judges sometimes engage in interstitial poli-
cymaking, the court nonetheless held that "[t]he principal business of the
courts is the resolution of disputes.' 53  The Second Circuit also re-
sponded to the First and Eighth Circuits by suggesting that there can be
no rational justification for mandatory retirement of state judges. 54
Finally, the Second Circuit noted that the language and structure of
the exemption clause dictate that the policymaking exception "share ba-
sic characteristics of the categories that surrounded it."'55 Thus, policy-
makers under the exemption clause, it reasoned, are people who work
closely with their appointing officer. 6
48. See id.
49. See id. at 798-800.
50. Id. at 799 (citing 118 Cong. Rec. 4492-93 (1972)). The Vermont court also noted
that Senator Javits suggested narrowing the scope of the "adviser" exemption to include
only the "higher officials in a policymaking or policy advising capacity." See id. at 799
(citing 118 Cong. Rec. 4097, 4493 (1972)).
51. See id. at 800.
52. See id.
53. Id. Even when a statute is unclear on a matter, the Vermont court stated that
judges must "fathom the nature and contours of policies established by the legislative and
executive branches rather than to create or fashion new policy." Id.
It has been noted, however, that states that elect their judges have decided to make
them policymakers, responsive to the voters, while states with an appointed bench have
chosen to insulate their judges from the political process. See Brief of the EEOC as Ami-
cus Curiae at 9 n.7, Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct.
507 (1990). But see Gregory, 898 F.2d at 603 n.5 (rejecting distinction between elected
and appointed judges).
54. See EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 802 (2d Cir. 1990). The court intimated
that mandatory retirement must not be used as a tool to resolve problems of supervising
and removing older judges because the very purpose of ADEA is to prohibit such arbi-
trary age classifications, relying instead on individualized evaluation of older workers.
See id. But see note 44 and accompanying text.
55. Vermont, 904 F.2d at 798.
56. See id.
[Vol. 59
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3. Congress Intended Appointed State Court Judges to be Protected
from Age Discrimination
The legislative history of the policymaking exception indicates that
Congress intended ADEA to protect as many state employees as possible
from arbitrary age discrimination.57 The explanatory statement's order
to construe the exemption clause narrowly demonstrates Congress's de-
sire to prevent courts from excluding too many state officials from
ADEA's protection.58 Moreover, the relevant congressional debate dem-
onstrates that few government officials were exempted from coverage. 9
Even Senator Ervin conceded that he could not "persuade the Senate to
adopt" a more expansive exclusion.'
Unlike the Second Circuit, the First and Eighth Circuits did not con-
sider the full course of the congressional debate. Their interpretation of
the policymaking exception's legislative history seems to have been
guided by an underlying belief that applying ADEA to appointed state
court judges intrudes upon state sovereignty.6'
Although acknowledging that federalism issues were involved, the Sec-
ond Circuit found that Garcia precludes judicial review of these issues
when there is no proof that the political process involved in enacting
ADEA was defective. 62 A discussion of Garcia is absent from the First
and Eighth Circuit opinions. These courts may well have deliberately
avoided a critical analysis of the Garcia approach to federalism, instead
57. Too broad an exemption would be "at variance with or in violation of the thrust,
the scope, or the purposes of [the] legislation." See 118 Cong. Rec. 4493 (1972) (state-
ment by Senator Williams).
58. See Joint Explanatory Statement of Managers at the Conference on H.R. 1746 to
Further Promote Equal Employment Opportunities for American Workers, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2179, 2180; see also EEOC
v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 800 (2d Cir. 1990) (direction that exemption clause be con-
strued narrowly supports excluding judges from clause). Additionally, the placement of
the policymaking exception between two exceptions for appointees who work closely with
their appointing official implies that it applies solely to people who work closely with
their appointing officer. See Vermont, 904 F.2d at 798; supra notes 55-56 and accompa-
nying text.
59. See 118 Cong. Rec. 4096-97, 4483-93 (1972). State judges were mentioned only
once in the course of the debate, when Senator Ervin first proposed the exemption clause.
See id. at 4096. On the final day of the debate, Senator Williams and Senator Ervin
agreed that the exemption clause applied only to appointees who are cabinet officers and
immediate legal advisors to a Governor. See 118 Cong. Rec. 4493 (1972).
60. Id.
61. Indeed, the First Circuit stated that ADEA's application to the states must strike
a "delicate balance between the protection of employees from age discrimination, and the
protection of a state's-and its people's-ability to independently govern itself." EEOC
v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 56-57 (1st Cir. 1988). Similarly, the Eighth Circuit held
that "the tenure of state judges is a matter of considerable importance to a state," and
that ADEA's application to state judges would "significantly intrude[]" on state sover-
eignty. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 600 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, Ill S. Ct. 507
(1990).
62. See EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 802 (2d Cir. 1990). For a discussion of
Garcia, see infra notes 79-95 and accompanying text.
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engaging in result-oriented statutory interpretation.63
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONFLICTS BETWEEN FEDERALISM AND
THE COMMERCE POWER
A. A Historical Introduction
The conflict between federalism and the Commerce Clause has its
roots in the United States Constitution, which established our federal
system of government and granted Congress enumerated and limited
powers.' Under Article I, section 8, Congress has the power to "regu-
late Commerce ... among the several States,"' 65 but this power is limited
by other substantive provisions in the Constitution. 66 The primary limi-
tation on the commerce power is the tenth amendment, which recognizes
the separate and independent existence of the states.
Because the tenth amendment is couched in negative language, federal
courts have found that limitations on Congress are implicit in its enumer-
ated powers.68 Nevertheless, the spirit of the tenth amendment mandates
that states retain their integrity as separate and independent units within
the federal system.69 In addition, the federal system is designed so that
"neither government may destroy the other nor curtail in any substantial
63. The First and Eighth Circuits' approach arguably adheres to the doctrine of con-
stitutional avoidance. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
64. The Federalist No. 44, at 256 (J. Madison) (G. Smith ed. 1901).
65. See U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl.3.
66. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 570 (1985)
(Powell, J., dissenting) ("Under the Constitution, the sphere of the proposed government
extended to jurisdiction of 'certain enumerated objects only .... leav[ing] to the several
States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects.' ") (quoting The Fed-
eralist No. 39, at 256 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
44 (1971) (in federal system, federal government must not interfere with legitimate state
activities); Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868) (Constitution recog-
nizes "the necessary existence of the States, and, within their proper spheres, the in-
dependent authority of the States"); The Federalist No. 44, at 254 (J. Madison) (G. Smith
ed. 1901) ("State governments may be regarded as constituent and essential parts of the
federal government; while the latter is nowise essential to the ... organization of the
former").
67. The tenth amendment provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const. amend. X.
68. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 582 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 493 (1957); United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 96
(1947); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941); Jersey Central Power and
Light Co. v. Township of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103, 1110 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1013; see also The Federalist No. 45, at 258 (J. Madison) (G. Smith ed. 1901) (text of
Constitution protects state sovereignty by specifically defining Congress's few and limited
powers).
69. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 585 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Fry v. U.S., 421
U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)). The Constitution was designed to limit the power of the fed-
eral government. See id. at 582; see also Redish & Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and
Judicial Review: The Role of TextualAnalysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 4-5 (1987) (Consti-
tution's "textual provisions designed to preserve a balance within the federal system" and
provide guidance in judicial review); The Federalist No. 45, at 257 (J. Madison) (G.
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manner the exercise of its powers." 7
While recognizing that federalism principles impose limitations on the
commerce power, the Supreme Court has refused to define the nature
and content of those limitations because of the "elusiveness of objective
criteria for 'fundamental' elements of state sovereignty."'" As a result,
the Court's approach to conflicts between federalism and the Commerce
Clause has swung from periods of careful scrutiny of federal laws passed
under the Commerce Clause72 to periods of extreme deference 73 to
Smith ed. 1901) (text of Constitution adequately protects state autonomy because Con-
gress's powers are limited).
The text of the Constitution does not provide for judicial deference to Congress when
reviewing laws passed under the Commerce Clause. See Redish & Drizin, supra, at 45.
The Constitution's federalism provisions are not "merely advisory;" they must be read in
conjunction with the commerce power and the tension between them must be resolved to
preserve the federal balance. See id at 40-41.
70. Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926); see supra note 66.
71. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 548 (1985).
72. The Supreme Court first used its power of review to restrict the commerce power
during the period between 1888 and 1936. See J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Con-
stitutional Law § 4.5 (3d ed. 1986); see, eg., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275-76
(1918) (Congress has no power to regulate production of goods within a state by regulat-
ing interstate shipment), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941);
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (Sherman Antitrust Act could not be
applied to intrastate monopoly acquisition of sugar refineries because regulation of manu-
facturing was state power); see also Skover, "Phoenix Rising" and Federalism Analysis, 13
Hastings Const. L.Q. 271, 279 (1986) (between 1887 and 1937, Court limited scope of
Congress's commerce power); Redish & Drizin, supra note 69, at 2 (Court substantially
intervened to protect state sovereignty interests against federal encroachment under
Commerce Clause).
The Court again restricted Congress's power under the Commerce Clause during the
period between 1976 and 1985 by using a balancing test developed in Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). Under this approach, the
Court considered whether the challenged federal law regulated the states as states,
whether the law addressed matters that were indisputably attributes of state sovereignty
and directly impaired a state's ability to structure integral operations in areas of tradi-
tional functions, and whether the federal interest in having the law outweighed any in-
fringement on state sovereignty. See id. at 289-90. For applications of this test, see
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 237-39 (1983); United Transport. Union v. Long Is-
land R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 685 (1982); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 764-65 (1982).
73. The Supreme Court permitted more expansive commerce laws during two periods
of its history. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), is the landmark case
illustrating the Court's earliest treatment of the Commerce Clause. In this case, Chief
Justice Marshall defined the Commerce Clause as broad enough to be exercised within a
state. See id at 195. According to Marshall, only activities "completely within a particu-
lar state, which do not affect other states, and with which it is not necessary to interfere,
for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government" are protected
from the reach of the commerce power. See id. at 195.
Between 1937 and 1976, the Court again adopted a broad view of the commerce power,
substantially deferring to Congress when reviewing laws passed under the Commerce
Clause. See, eg., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964)
(valid exercise of commerce power to prohibit discrimination in small hotel under Civil
Rights Act of 1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (Congress, under
powers of Commerce Clause, may regulate customer serving policies of restaurant under
Civil Rights Act of 1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. I11, 127-28 (1942) (upholding
federal law regulating individual farmers' wheat production for home consumption on
1990]
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Congress.
Garcia" represents the Court's current approach to federalism. Gar-
cia expressly overruled National League of Cities v. Usery," which held
that applying the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") 7 6 to the states was
unconstitutional because it directly impaired a state's ability to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional state functions. 77 Garcia re-
jected this "integral operations" reasoning as unworkable.78
B. The Garcia Approach
In Garcia, the Court held that applying the FLSA to the states was
constitutional. 79  Although the Court acknowledged that states "occupy
a special" and specific sovereign existence in our federal system, it re-
fused to define substantive limitations on the Commerce Clause or to
identify a sphere of state sovereignty immune from that power."0 The
majority stated that a "rule of state immunity from federal regulation
that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental
function is 'integral' or 'traditional.'. . . leads to inconsistent results at the.
same time that it disserves principles of democratic self-governance."8"
Such a rule, the Court reasoned, invites unelected judges to "make deci-
sions about which state policies [and activities] it favors and which ones
it dislikes."8 2
In addition, the Garcia Court precluded judicial review of federalism-
basis of potential cumulative effect on interstate commerce); United States v. Wrightwood
Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 125 (1942) (upholding federal regulation of intrastate produc-
tion and sale of milk); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124-26 (1941) (application of
Fair Labor Standards Act's hour and wage regulations to employees engaged in produc-
tion of goods for interstate commerce upheld); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (National Labor Relations Act's regulation of intrastate activities
upheld). See generally Skover, supra note 72, at 283 (Court substantially deferred to
Congress in reviewing laws passed under the Commerce Clause); Redish & Drizin, supra
note 69, at 2 (same); Lieberman, Modern Federalism: Altered States, 20 Urb. Law. 285,
287-88 (1988) (same).
74. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528.
75. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S. 528.
76. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988).
77. See National League, 426 U.S. at 845-52. The Court in National League held that
it was unconstitutional to apply the FLSA to state employers because states' independent
and separate existences are threatened if the federal government deprives states of the
power to determine the wages and hours of state employees. See id. at 851. After Na-
tional League, the Court began to use a balancing test to determine whether a federal law
violated the Constitution's federalism provisions. See supra note 72.
78. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 545-47.
79. See id. at 555-56.
80. See id. at 547-48. Indeed, the narrow majority doubted that courts "can identify
principled constitutional limitations on the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause powers
over the States merely by relying on a priori definitions of state sovereignty." Id. at 548.
81. Id. at 546-47.
82. See id. at 546. Justice Powell's dissent noted, however, that our democratic tradi-
tion envisions the states as "laboratories for social and economic experiment." He argued
that leaving the states at the mercy of Congress, "without recourse to judicial review,"
undermines this democratic tradition. See id. at 567-68 n. 13 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Commerce Clause issues absent proof of a defect in the political pro-
cess. 83 State sovereignty, it stated, is protected by "procedural safe-
guards inherent in the structure of the federal system."'  While
conceding that the structure of the federal system has changed since its
inception,85 the Court nevertheless found that the political process still
protects state autonomy. 6
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Garcia spawned vehement dis-
sents.8 7 Justice Powell argued that five unelected justices had reduced
the tenth amendment to "meaningless rhetoric 88 by rejecting 200 years
of precedent regarding "the constitutional status of federalism."'89 He
contended that federal courts can determine which areas of state activity
are immune from the Commerce Clause by using the balancing test'
that the Court developed after National League.9
Justice O'Connor similarly criticized the majority's refusal to define
and enforce affirmative limits on the commerce power.92 Federalism
83. See id. at 554.
84. Id. at 552. The Court held that Congress is better situated to protect state inter-
ests. See id.
85. The Court noted that the adoption of the seventeenth amendment in 1913 signifi-
cantly altered "the influence of the States in the federal political process." See id. at 554.
The seventeenth amendment provides for popular election of Senators, who were previ-
ously selected by state legislatures. See U.S. Const. amend. XVII.
86. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985).
87. See supra note 1.
88. Justice Powell detailed the creation of our federal system and disputed Justice
Blackmun's contention that judicial enforcement of the tenth amendment is an unsound
principle. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 570-79 (Powell, J., dissenting). Not only is judicial
enforcement of the tenth amendment essential to maintaining our federal system, he
stated, but it is the Court's constitutional responsibility. See id. at 579. Justice Powell
argued that the Framers intended the tenth amendment to preserve the status of the
states as coordinate elements in our federal union and to prevent them from being rele-
gated to trivial factors in the "'shifting economic arrangements' of our country." Id. at
574.
89. See id at 560 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell criticized the majority for
abandoning its responsibility of judicial review, noting that the Court had never before
held that states can protect themselves through the electoral process. See id. at 567 n. 12
(Powell, J., dissenting).
90. The balancing test considers "the strength of the federal interest in the challenged
legislation and the impact of exempting the States from its reach." Id. at 563 n.5 (Powell,
J., dissenting). For a discussion of the development and application of this test, see supra
notes 72 & 77.
91. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 562-63 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell stated that
judicial review of conflicts between federalism and the commerce power is necessary be-
cause Congress alone cannot adequately protect state interests. See id. at 565-67 (Powell,
J., dissenting). Neither the states' success at getting federal funding nor the presence of
representatives in Congress from each state, he argued, is sufficient proof that the political
process protects state sovereignty. See id. at 566-67. Powell reasoned that changes in the
federal structure have made Congress "particularly insensitive" to state interests. See id.
at 565 n.9. He noted, for example, that the weakening of local political parties and the
rise of national media have shifted Congress's attention from state to national concerns.
See id.
92. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 587 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Although it is difficult to "craft bright lines" defining areas of
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principles embodied in the text and history of the Constitution, she ar-
gued, require the Court to use its power of review to prevent Congress
from upsetting the balance of power between the states and the federal
government that is essential to the "efficiency and vitality" of our na-
tion.93 Justice O'Connor also stated that the political process cannot
protect state sovereignty because of changes in the national political pro-
cess that have accentuated Congress's "underdeveloped capacity for self-
restraint.
9 4
In a one-paragraph dissent, Justice Rehnquist also vigorously dis-
agreed with Garcia's approach to federalism and joined in both Justices
Powell and O'Connor's dissents. National League should be affirmed, he
argued, because federalism principles prohibit Congress from acting
under its "commerce power to infringe on certain fundamental aspects of
state sovereignty that are essential to 'the States' separate and independ-
ent existence.' "95
C. The Problem with Garcia and its Relevance to the ADEA Cases
States whose mandatory retirement laws have been challenged argue
that ADEA's application to state judges infringes on their right to struc-
ture their judiciaries. 96 Although courts have resolved these cases on
statutory grounds, implicit in the opinions is the view that such applica-
tion of ADEA would impermissibly interfere with an important state
sovereignty right. " History, federal courts' procedural rules and case
law also demonstrate that the ability of states to structure their judiciar-
ies is a traditional and important state right.
When the Framers established the Supreme Court, they recognized the
independent authority of existing state courts. 98 Alexander Hamilton
state sovereignty that are immune from the Commerce Clause, Justice O'Connor stated
that it is the Court's responsibility to reconcile the conflicts between federalism and the
commerce power. See id. at 588-89.
93. See id. at 584-87 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
94. See id. at 584-588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor agreed with Jus-
tice Powell that Congress focused on national rather than state issues. See id. at 584;
supra note 91.
95. Id. at 579-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
96. See supra notes 27 & 44 and accompanying text.
97. The Gregory court, for example, stated that ADEA's application to state judges
would significantly intrude on a traditionally sensitive state sovereignty right. See Greg-
ory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 600 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, Ill S. Ct. 507 (1990). Simi-
larly, the Massachusetts court argued that a state's ability to determine the tenure of state
judges is an intimate and fundamental aspect of self-governance and state autonomy. See
EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 53 (1st Cir. 1988); see also EEOC v. Illinois, 721 F.
Supp. 156, 159 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (state's ability to determine the tenure of its own judiciary
is a right close to the heart of state sovereignty); Apkin v. Treasurer and Receiver Gen.,
401 Mass. 427, 431, 517 N.E.2d 141, 143 (1988) (fundamental state sovereignty right
invaded by ADEA's application to state judges).
98. Although the records of the Constitutional Convention contain little comment on
the judiciary, one of the reasons for creating one Supreme Court and no lower courts was
that many of the Framers believed that cases could and should be tried in state courts.
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wrote that "the State courts will retain the jurisdiction they now have,
unless it appears to be taken away in one of the enumerated modes.""
Moreover, the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution was
drafted explicitly recognizing the integrity and separate existence of state
courts. "° After the Constitution was ratified, Congress continued to
show deference to state courts and laws by enacting the Judiciary Act of
1789.10!
Procedural rules such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3),
which requires a federal court to dismiss an action "[w]henever it ap-
pears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks juris-
diction of the subject matter,"'' 0 and the abstention doctrine, which is
See M. Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States 154-55 (1913); see
also C. Tansil, Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 as reported by James Madison,
in Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States 404-05
(H. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., Ist Sess. 1927) (statements by Pierce Butler and Luther
Martin that lower courts should not be established in the Constitution because they are
an unnecessary interference in state court authority). See generally C. Wright, Law of
Federal Courts § 1, at 2 (4th ed. 1983) (discussing creation of federal judiciary by Fram-
ers); C. Warren, The Making of the Constitution 534-44 (1928) (same); R. Bernstein &
K. Rice, Are We To Be A Nation? The Making of the Constitution 170-71, 174-75
(1987) (same).
99. The Federalist No. 82, at 454 (A. Hamilton) (G. Smith ed. 1901); see also The
Federalist No. 78, at 433 (A. Hamilton) (G. Smith ed. 1901) (acknowledging competence
of state courts).
100. The clause provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. Const. art. IV,
§ 1. The clause serves "to insure comity and courtesy among the states 'to help fuse into
one Nation a collection of independent, sovereign states.'" J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J.
Young, Constitutional Law § 9.6, at 303 (3d ed. 1986) (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334
U.S. 385, 395 (1948)). This clause requires the courts of one state to respect and enforce
the decisions of courts from sister states. See id. at 304. Cooperation among all state
courts contributes to the Union and acknowledges the power of individual state govern-
ments. The clause's express recognition of the valid and separate existence of state judi-
ciaries underscores their importance to state sovereignty. The states' ability to structure
their judiciaries is, therefore, closely related to their sovereign existence.
101. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73. Rather than granting the Supreme Court the
full power allowed by the Constitution, the Act limited its appellate jurisdiction. See id.
§ 13, at 81. Implicit in this limitation on federal court jurisdiction is the recognition that
state courts are competent to adjudicate most issues. See supra note 98. In addition, it
provided that "the laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or
statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules
of decision in trials at common law." Judiciary Act of 1789 § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (codified
as amended 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988)). This section of the Act is known as the Rules of
Decision Act and explicitly defers to state laws by mandating their use.
102. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). This rule is based on the concept of limited jurisdiction,
which presumes that federal courts lack jurisdiction until the party seeking review proves
its authority to invoke such review. See McMicken v. Webb, 36 U.S. (II Peters) 25, 32
(1837); Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 11 (1799); C. Wright, supra note 98,
§ 7, at 23. Although a harsh rule for parties seeking to adjudicate their claims in federal
court, it is justified "by the delicate problems of federal-state relations that are involved."
C. Wright, supra note 98, § 7, at 23. But see Morse, Judicial Self-Denial and Judicial
Activism: The Personality of the Original Jurisdiction of the District Courts, 3 Clev.-Mar-
shall St. L. Rev. 101, 101 (1954) (criticizing doctrine of limited jurisdiction as waste of
time, effort and money).
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invoked "to avoid needless conflict with the administration by a state of
its own affairs," 103 similarly recognize the validity of independent state
courts.
Federal case law also suggests that a state's ability to structure and
maintain its own government is essential to state autonomy in our federal
system. 1' Lastly, many commentators have argued that the states' right
to structure their own government is so traditional and important that
Congress would not purport to abrogate it.'0 5 Thus, even the most re-
strictive view of a traditional state function would include a state's ability
to create its own court system. 106
Because the ability of the states to determine the structure of their
judiciaries is crucial to their separate and independent existence,
ADEA's application to appointed state court judges intrudes on a realm
of activity traditionally and peculiarly left to the states. "[I]n light of the
significant intrusion into [this] properly state-dominated affair[]," 10 7 judi-
cial review seems particularly necessary. Garcia, however, precludes ju-
dicial review of its application to state judges' 8 because there was no
103. C. Wright, supra note 98, § 52, at 303. This doctrine requires a federal court to
decline jurisdiction or to postpone its exercise even though diversity jurisdiction require-
ments are satisfied. See id. at 302-03; see also Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern
Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 349 (1951) (should invoke doctrine when an "adequate state court
review of an administrative order based upon predominantly local factors [wa]s available
to appellee"); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332-34 (1943) (doctrine should have
been applied because state courts better equipped to resolve issues involving state laws).
104. In Coyle v. Smith, for example, the Court held that the power of a state to "locate
its own seat of government and to determine when and how it shall be changed from one
place to another... [is] essentially and peculiarly [a] state power]." Coyle, 221 U.S. 559,
565 (1911). Similarly, in Texas v. White, the Court described the states as separate polit-
ical communities that organize their own government. See White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700,
725 (1868).
Justice Rehnquist cited both Coyle and White in his majority opinion in National
League as precedent for the principle that the commerce power is limited by federalism
concerns. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 844-45 (1976), overruled
by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Justice Rehnquist
relied more on historical precedent and case law than on the tenth amendment as a limit
on Congress's commerce power. See id. at 844. Indeed, the tenth amendment is men-
tioned only once in the National League opinion. See id. at 842.
105. See Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism & Affirm-
ative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1070 (1977); Van
Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1709, 1716-17 (1985); Field,
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority: The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine,
99 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 105 (1985).
106. "[O]ne thinks of the power to determine the basic structure of state government-
... to fix the terms of office for state officials, for example-as a state prerogative which
ought to be immune from federal intrusion." Tribe, supra note 105, at 1070; see also
Field, supra note 105, at 105 (organization of government is state sovereignty interest
immune from reach of Commerce Clause); Van Alstyne, supra note 105, at 1716-17 (abil-
ity of state to create and structure its own court system is traditional state function).
107. EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 54 (1st Cir. 1988).
108. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
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defect in the process of enacting ADEA or any of its amendments.t" 9
The ADEA cases, therefore, provide a new battleground for Garcia's
critics, especially those who criticized its limits on judicial review. Gar-
cia's renunciation of the review power' 01 is contrary to both historical
precedent11 and the text of the Constitution." 2  Since Marbury v.
Madison,"3 the well-established role of the courts is "'to say what the
law is' with respect to the constitutionality of [federal statutes]."" ,4 Fur-
ther, no provision in the Constitution authorizes the Court to treat state
sovereignty rights differently from other rights by denying them the pro-
tection of judicial review." 5 Withholding review of conflicts between
federalism and the commerce clause "interpolates a different sort of
clause in article III" of the Constitution that would nullify the role of
states in the federal system. 1 6
109. See EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 802 (2d Cir. 1990); Schlitz v. Virginia, 681
F. Supp. 330, 332 (E.D. Va.), rev'd on other grounds, 854 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1988).
110. The dissenters in Garcia criticized the majority for abdicating judicial review. See
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 581 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist); see also Van Alstyne, supra, note
105, at 1724 ("Garcia proposes the piecemeal repeal ofjudicial review"); Comment, State
Autonomy After Garcia: Will the Political Process Protect States' Interests?, 71 Iowa L.
Rev. 1527, 1539 (1986) (Garcia abdicated judicial review).
The majority in Garcia, however, stated that it did construe both the tenth amendment
and the commerce power to reach its decision. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547-48. The
Court stated that except for the limitations on Congress implicit in the "delegated nature
of Congress' Article I powers," state sovereignty is protected by the "structure of the
Federal Government itself." Id Any substantive restraint on the commerce power, it
reasoned, must be justified by a failure of the political process and must be tailored to
address that process "rather than to dictate a 'sacred province of state autonomy.'" Id.
at 554. Garcia, therefore, can be viewed as a decision that construes the Constitution as
fixing "the principle locus of tenth amendment adjudication in Congress." Van Alstyne,
supra note 105, at 1720; see also Field, supra note 105, at 114 (Garcia Court "promised
substantial deference to judgments of Congress" rather than forsaking "review of ques-
tions concerning the 'rights of States' ") (citations omitted).
111. Garcia's abdication of judicial review "radically departted] from long-settled con-
stitutional values and ignore[d] the [historical] role" of the review power in our federal
system. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 561 (1985) (Powell,
J., dissenting); see id at 587 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Field, supra note 105, at 101-02;
Redish & Drizin, supra note 69, at 35-37; Freilich, Greenhagen & Lamkin, The Demise
of the Tenth Amendment: An Analysis of Supreme Court Decisions Affecting Constitu-
tional Federalism, 17 Urb. Law. 651, 661 (1985).
112. See, e.g., Redish & Drizin, supra note 69, at 34-35 (text of the Constitution con-
templates judicial review of federalism issues); supra note 69 (same).
113. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
114. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 567 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also id. at 581 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("this Court cannot abdicate its constitutional responsibility to oversee the
Federal Government's compliance with its duty to respect the legitimate interests of the
States"); Field, supra note 105, at 101-02 (one of the Court's functions is to balance feder-
alism rights against rights of Congress under Commerce Clause); Tribe, supra note 105,
at 1071 (Court must prevent Congress "from acting in ways that would leave a state
formally intact but functionally a gutted shell").
115. See Van Alstyne, supra note 105, at 1730; Redish & Drizin, supra note 69, at 35-
37.
116. Van Alstyne, supra note 105, at 1726.
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Should the Supreme Court follow the Garcia approach and hold that
ADEA applies to appointed state court judges, a traditional and impor-
tant state sovereignty right will be abrogated without judicial scrutiny. "7
The paucity of legislative history regarding the policymaking exception
indicates that Congress failed to consider how ADEA's application to
state judges would impair states' ability to structure their own judicial
systems."18 Except for Senator Ervin's brief reference to judges, the con-
gressional debate focused on government officials in the executive
branch.119 By enacting the exemption clause, Congress acknowledged
that ADEA's application to certain government officials impermissibly
infringed on state sovereignty.' 20 Congress did not, however, discuss its
application to appointed state court judges, and seems to have over-
looked the infringement on state sovereignty inherent therein.
The ADEA example illustrates that the political process does not al-
ways protect state sovereignty. Congress should not be "the sole judge[
of the limits of [its] own power"1 2 ' because the nationalization of the
political process prevents adequate consideration of states' rights. 22 Not
only did the adoption of the seventeenth amendment decrease states' con-
trol over the election of senators, 23 but the Voting Rights Act's 24 regu-
lation of state election processes similarly decreased states' control over
the election of other state officials.' 25 The increasing influence of na-
tional interest groups on congressional votes and of national political
parties in general has also led Congress to focus on national rather than
state concerns.1 26 Lastly, states' interests are not always easy to recog-
117. This was the result in Vermont. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
118. See generally 118 Cong. Rec. 4096-97, 4483-93 (Feb. 16 & 17, 1972) (Congres-
sional debate shows no consideration of ADEA's application to appointed state court
judges); see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
120. See 118 Cong. Rec. 4483 (1972). Senator Ervin proposed that Congress adopt an
exception for certain government officials precisely because he was concerned about
states' rights. He stated, "I know of no way in which Congress can more effectively
destroy the States than for Congress to takeo] away from the community ... the right to
elect their own officials and select their own employees." Id.
121. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 567 (1985) (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting).
122. See Freilich, Greenhagen & Lamkin, supra note 111, at 661; Tribe, supra note
105, at 1071-72; Brown, State Sovereignty Under the Burger Court-How the Eleventh
Amendment Survived the Death of the Tenth: Some Broader Implications of Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 74 Geo. L.J. 363, 375 (1985); Comment, supra, note 110, at 1550;
Comment, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority and the Manifest
Destiny of Congressional Power [hereinafter "Manifest Destiny of Congressional Power"], 8
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 745, 760-61 (1985); supra notes 91 & 94.
123. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
124. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988)).
125. See Freilich, Greenhagen & Lamkin, supra note 118, at 661; Comment, Manifest
Destiny of Congressional Power, supra note 122, at 760-61.
126. See Freilich, Greenhagen & Lamkin, supra, note 111, at 661; Tribe, supra note
105, at 1071-72; Brown, supra note 122, at 375; Comment, Manifest Destiny of Congres-
sional Power, supra note 122, at 760-61; Comment, supra note 110, at 1551.
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nize. 27 Judicial review of conflicts between federalism and the Com-
merce Clause, therefore, seems appropriate "in those rare instances in
which Congress, despite the political safeguards of federalism, takes ac-
tion that would effectively eviscerate a state's government and leave it an
empty vessel."' 128
Gregory 129 presents an occasion for the Court to define a discrete area
of state activity immune from the Commerce Clause: a state's ability to
determine the structure of its own government. Declaring this area of
state sovereignty immune from the commerce power would be consistent
with Garcia's suggestion that substantive limits on the Commerce Clause
do exist. 130 Such a declaration, however, would necessitate resuming ju-
dicial review of federalism issues. The Court could still substantially de-
fer to Congress by reasserting review of federalism conflicts only when
Congress appears to have overlooked a traditional right essential to the
separate and independent existence of the states. Because such a right is
jeopardized in Gregory, judicial review of ADEA's application to state
judges is imperative.
CONCLUSION
ADEA's legislative history reveals that appointed state court judges
are not properly viewed as policymakers within the meaning of the ex-
ception. If ADEA is interpreted correctly, however, the states' funda-
mental right to determine the structure of their judiciaries is abrogated
because Garcia prohibits judicial review of ADEA's application to state
judges. When the Supreme Court considers Gregory this spring, it will
have an occasion to reassess Garcia should it hold that state judges are
not policymakers exempt from ADEA. In light of the important state
right at issue and of Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor's strong dissents
in Garcia, carpe diem may well be the battle cry of the new majority. 13
Katharine L Huth
127. See Tribe, supra note 105, at 1072. Congress's failure to consider states' interests
in determining the tenure of their judges may indicate that this interest was difficult to
recognize when the exemption clause was enacted. See supra notes 57-60 and accompa-
nying text.
128. Tribe, supra note 105, at 1072; see also Field, supra note 105, at 105 (Court's
approach to federalism should confine protected state activities to a small area, such as
the organization of state and local governments).
129. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir.), cert granted, 111 S. Ct. 507 (1990).
130. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547-48 (1985).
131. Since Garcia was decided in 1985, Justices Burger, Powell and Brennan have
stepped down from the bench. At least two conservative, "states' rights" advocates, Jus-
tices Scalia and Kennedy, have filled their posts.
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